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FAMILY LAW—THE REHABILITATION ILLUSION: HOW ALIMONY 
REFORM IN MASSACHUSETTS FAILS TO COMPENSATE FOR CAREGIVING 
INTRODUCTION 
When the Massachusetts Legislature unanimously passed the 
Alimony Reform Act of 2011,1 the bill was heralded as a “sweeping 
overhaul,” a long overdue change that would improve the predictability 
of divorce cases in the Commonwealth.2  Senator Gale Candaras, a 
Democrat who co-sponsored the bill, believed that the legislation was 
necessary in order to adjust to the changing times; “[the previous] law 
has not changed in four decades, and the world has changed a thousand 
times in four decades.”3 
However, for all the ways in which the world has changed in the 
past four decades, there are many ways in which it has not.4  When 
President Kennedy signed the Equal Pay Act in 1963,5 women earned 
just 58.9% of the wages men earned.6  Since that time, women’s pay has 
increased by less than a penny per year.7  Fifty years later, women earn 
 
1. See Alimony Reform Act of 2011, ch. 125, 2011 Mass. Acts 574 (codified at MASS. 
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 208, § 34 (West 2012)). 
2. See Jack Flynn, Gov. Patrick OKs ‘Sweeping Overhaul’ of Massachusetts Alimony 
Laws, SPRINGFIELD REPUBLICAN (Sept. 26, 2011), http://www.masslive.com/news/index.ssf/2 
011/09/gov_patrick_oks_sweeping_overh.html (covering the support of the Alimony Reform 
Act bill from Senators and the Massachusetts Bar Association). 
3. Id. 
4. See generally INST. FOR WOMEN’S POL’Y RES., STATE-BY-STATE RANKINGS AND 
DATA ON INDICATORS OF WOMEN’S SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC STATUS, 2010,  
http://www.iwpr.org/initiatives/states/state-by-state-rankings-data-2010 (indicating that 
women make less than men for full-time; year-round employment in every state; low rates of 
women in managerial or professional occupations; and low number of women-owned 
businesses); THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF ECONOMIC EQUALITY 290 (Wiemer Salverda, 
Brian Nolan & Timothy M. Smeeding eds., 2009) (analyzing world-wide trends in pay 
inequity: “[s]eparate pay rates for men and women . . . are now illegal, and have been for half 
a century in the developed world. But the gender pay gap survives universally”). 
5. Equal Pay Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88–38, 77 Stat. 56.  Notably, President Kennedy 
remarked that working mothers “bear the heaviest burden of any group in our Nation.”  John 
F. Kennedy, Remarks Upon Signing the Equal Pay Act (June 10, 1963), available at 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=9267. 
6. Jacqueline A. Berrien, Chair, U.S. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n, Statement on 
Equal Pay Day (Apr. 17, 2012), available at http://www1.eeoc.gov//eeoc/newsroom/wysk/s 
tatement_equal_pay_day_2012.cfm?renderforprint=1. 
7. Id. 
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only $.81 for every dollar that men earn.8  Women also still perform the 
majority of unpaid work, including child care, housework, and other 
intangible contributions to the home.9 
When so much inequality still exists, what are the potential effects 
and dangers of a “sweeping overhaul?”10  While the Alimony Reform 
Act is invaluable in providing durational limits for alimony, there are 
many questions still left unanswered.11  This Note addresses one of those 
unanswered questions and advocates for amendments to the formal 
introduction of “rehabilitative alimony,” which provides short term 
alimony to dependent spouses in order to facilitate re-entry to the 
workforce.12  In an Act filled with guidelines, factors, and timetables,13 
there must also be clarity provided as to what it means to be 
“rehabilitated.”14  As it stands now, the statute begins and ends with self-
sufficiency.15 
What does Massachusetts mean by self-sufficiency?  How will 
courts know whether a former spouse is rehabilitated?  Without a 
statutory definition of self-sufficiency, Massachusetts is in danger of 
answering these questions by allowing divorced women to live at a level 
of mere subsistence while their former husbands enjoy a higher earning 
capacity achieved through their unpaid labor.  
This Note will examine, from a feminist perspective,16 the failures 
 
8. Equal Pay, DEP’T. OF LABOR, http://www.dol.gov/equalpay/ (last visited May 14, 
2014); Equal Pay for Equal Work? New Evidence on Persistence of the Gender Pay Gap: 
Hearing before the Joint Econ. Comm., 111th Cong. 1, (2009) [hereinafter Persistence of the 
Gender Pay Gap] (statement of Carolyn B. Maloney, Chair, U.S. Representative, N.Y.), 
available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-111shrg52911/pdf/CHRG-111shrg52911.p 
df. 
9. Catherine Rampell, Women Lead in Unpaid Work, N.Y.TIMES ECONOMIX BLOG  
(March 10, 2011, 2:29 PM), http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/03/10/women-lead-in-
unpaid-work/. 
10. Flynn, supra note 2. 
11. See generally Mario C. Capano, New Alimony Reform Act: Consistency Breeds 
Confusion, MASS. LAW. WKLY. (Oct. 20, 2011, 4:57 PM), http://masslawyersweekly.com/2 
011/10/20/new-alimony-reform-act-consistency-breeds-confusion/. 
12. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 208, § 48 (2007 & Supp. 2013). 
13. Id. (alimony calculations and durational limits clearly set according to length of 
marriage). 
        14. See Cynthia Starnes, Divorce and the Displaced Homemaker: A Discourse on 
Playing with Dolls, Partnership Buyouts and Dissociation Under No-Fault, 60 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 67, 98 (1993) (stating that the use of the word “‘rehabilitation’ is an odd word choice, as 
if a woman were to be classed along with a criminal who, through rehabilitation, might be 
able to rise from vice to become a sound, productive citizen”). 
15. ch. 208 § 48. 
16. A feminist perspective is appropriate because the large majority of alimony 
recipients are women and the large majority of alimony payors are men.  The gender lens 
through which the following analysis is considered reflects the realities of such disparity.  
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of the Alimony Reform Act to fully consider and compensate women for 
unpaid contributions provided during the course of a marriage.  
Specifically, this Note will recommend that Massachusetts adopt an 
amendment to the Alimony Reform Act that provides clarity to the 
courts about what it means to be “self-sufficient” and measures that 
standard by the economic standing of the payor spouse. 
In Part II, this Note will review the evolution of alimony laws in the 
Commonwealth.  Particularly, it chronicles alimony’s long standing 
history in Massachusetts; from a period of great reliance on judicial 
discretion up to the most recent Alimony Reform movement.  Lastly, 
Part II details the changes the new statutes made, paying particular 
attention to the newly codified addition of rehabilitative alimony as a 
statutorily sanctioned alimony option. 
Part III then compares interpretations of self-sufficiency in Texas 
and Tennessee, as polarizing examples of how other jurisdictions have 
determined whether a recipient spouse can be rehabilitated.17  Texas 
promotes independence between the parties over economic parity, 
requiring only that a former spouse be rehabilitated to meet his/her 
“minimum reasonable needs.”18  On the other hand, Tennessee’s 
legislature has gone to great lengths to make it perfectly clear that both 
parties’ contributions to the household are highly valued.19  Tennessee’s 
equality-based approach ensures that an award of rehabilitative alimony 
will not result in the economic disadvantage of a spouse who made 
career sacrifices for caregiving.20  Part III concludes with an examination 
of the similarities of Massachusetts courts to the Tennessee style of 
interpreting self-sufficiency prior to alimony reform. 
In Part IV of this Note, gender-based obstacles to equal pay are 
 
However, it is acknowledged that the economic sacrifices experienced by caregiving mothers 
are shared by all caregivers who take time out of careers for family, regardless of gender.  For 
a more detailed discourse on feminist legal theory, see Pamela Laufer-Ukeles, Selective 
Recognition of Gender Difference in the Law: Revaluing the Caretaker Role, 31 HARV. J.L. & 
GENDER 1, 4 (2008) (“Gender neutrality continues to dominate the legal arena.  Recognition 
of difference is deemed suspect based on the fear of reinforcing problematic and hierarchal 
stereotypes, thereby undermining headway in women’s equality . . . . Ignoring difference 
ignores those particular attributes of biological and gender role difference that are valuable to 
society, such as caretaking.”).  See generally TRANSCENDING THE BOUNDARIES OF LAW: 
GENERATIONS OF FEMINISM AND LEGAL THEORY (Martha Albertson Fineman ed., Routledge 
2011).  Interestingly, Fineman remarks that “[l]aw as a discipline remains a tough terrain for 
feminist thought . . . .”  Id. at 2. 
17. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 8.054 (West 2006 & Supp. 2012); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-
5-121(c)(2) (2010). 
18. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 8.054 (West 2006 & Supp. 2012). 
19. TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-5-121(c)(2) (2010). 
20. Id. 
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critically examined as reasons why rehabilitation should be limited to 
only those spouses who can achieve economic success equal to their 
partners.  The persistence of the wage gap and contributing factors, such 
as unequal pay, gendered career choices, unpaid caregiving work, and 
negative career consequences of mothering, all act against women’s 
ability to earn the same as men. 
As a potential solution to the dangers of such an ambiguous 
standard of rehabilitation, Part IV of this Note recommends that 
Massachusetts adopt a legislative definition of self-sufficiency that 
promotes post-divorce financial parity between the spouses.  Using 
Tennessee’s rehabilitative alimony statute as an example,21 this Note 
proposes language that could be used to eliminate any confusion 
resulting from the pressure to make alimony reform more predictable. 
I.  THE ALIMONY EVOLUTION IN MASSACHUSETTS 
Although alimony has deep roots in Massachusetts jurisprudence, 
until recently it was governed by antiquated statutes.22  For more than 
thirty years, judicial discretion ruled alimony hearings in the 
Commonwealth.23  It was not until a few years ago, when the Alimony 
Reform movement gained momentum, that real changes started to take 
shape.  Large changes came swiftly after.  By 2011 Massachusetts was in 
the throes of a complete overhaul of their alimony system.24 
This section will walk through the history of alimony in 
Massachusetts and what led to the dramatic changes of the 2011 
Alimony Reform Act.  Section I.A will describe the earliest incarnations 
of alimony in the Commonwealth, as well as the long-standing 1974 
statute, which prompted the reform movement.  Section I.B analyzes 
some of the pre-reform cases that considered the possibility of 
rehabilitative alimony in Massachusetts, and demonstrates that those 
cases leaned toward a more equitable interpretation of self-sufficiency.  
Section I.C describes the objections of the two major reform advocacy 
groups, Massachusetts Alimony Reform and the Second Wives and 
Partners Club, as well as the work of the Legislative Task Force assigned 
with recommending changes.  Section I.C also chronicles the success of 
the Task Force in passing legislation that completely changed alimony 
 
21. Id.  
22. Charles P. Kindregan, Jr., Reforming Alimony: Massachusetts Reconsiders 
Postdivorce Spousal Support, 46 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 13, 1, 22-24 (2013) (recounting the 
evolution of alimony in Massachusetts). 
23. Id. at 24 (“Between 1974 and 2011 . . . the alimony statute’s vagueness caused 
various judges and lawyers to interpret it differently.”). 
24. Id. 
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awards throughout the state.  Lastly, section I.D breaks down the current 
statute to analyze the current formulaic approach and recommends a 
legislative definition of “self-sufficiency.”  
A. Alimony’s Deep Rooted History in Massachusetts 
Alimony has been part of Massachusetts’ history since the state’s 
inception, anchored in the world’s oldest written constitution in 
continuous effect.25  The first alimony statute dates back to 1785.26  
Since that time, alimony has undergone several statutory revisions, but 
the statute preceding the Alimony Reform Act of 2011 stood in place for 
more than three decades.27 
The 1974 statute provided broad judicial discretion and simply 
stated: “Upon divorce or upon a complaint brought in an action at any 
time after a divorce, whether such a divorce has been adjudged in this 
commonwealth or another jurisdiction, the court . . . may make a 
judgment for either of the parties to pay alimony to the other.”28  The 
statute provided for the basic right to alimony for parties in need by 
parties with the ability to pay;29 however, the statute did not provide 
courts with further guidance by defining what kinds of alimony were 
available or how the amount was to be determined.30  This left judges 
with an enormous amount of discretion which, as proponents of the 
Massachusetts Alimony Reform Act would later argue, created 
unpredictability in alimony rulings.31 
B. Rehabilitative Alimony Awards Prior to the Alimony Reform Act 
Even without a direct statutory definition, Massachusetts courts 
considered rehabilitative alimony a possibility under the 1974 alimony 
 
25. MASS. CONST. pt. II, ch. III. art. V  (providing that “[a]ll causes of marriage, 
divorce, and alimony . . . shall be heard and determined by the governor and council, until the 
legislature shall, by law, make other provision”); see John Adams and the Massachusetts 
Constitution, MAS.GOV, http://www.mass.gov/courts/court-info/sjc/edu-res-center/jn-
adams/mass-constitution-1-gen.html (last visited May 14, 2014) (stating that “[t]he 1780 
Constitution of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, drafted by John Adams, is the world’s 
oldest functioning written constitution.”). 
26. Act of Mar. 16, 1786, ch. 69, 1785 Mass. Acts 564. 
27. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 208, § 34, amended by Mass. St. 1974, c. 565, effective 




31. Our Primary Legislative Goals, MASS. ALIMONY REFORM, http://www.massalimon 
yreform.org/legislation.html (last visited May 14, 2014) (stating one of the legislative goals 
was to “[p]rovide equal and consistent treatment, where the outcome of a [sic] alimony case is 
not decided by the Russian Roulette selection of the family court judge”). 
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statute.32  However, courts were cautious to award rehabilitative alimony 
without direct statutory authority.  In the 1987 case Bak v. Bak, the 
Massachusetts Appeals Court was suspicious of the idea of short term 
alimony to promote self-sufficiency, stating that “[r]ehabilitative 
alimony is viewed with some circumspection in Massachusetts.”33 
In the 1996 decision Heins v. Ledis, the Supreme Judicial Court 
tried to define a situation in which rehabilitative alimony might be 
appropriate.34  The court ultimately found that the wife did not need any 
kind of alimony support, but explored the possibility of rehabilitative 
alimony generally, stating that “[w]e are aware of the use of 
‘rehabilitative alimony,’ in instances where one spouse is not 
immediately financially independent, but where factors make it 
relatively certain that financial support is needed only for a temporary 
period.”35 
At the start of the new millennium, Massachusetts courts added an 
element of equality to the evolving court dialogue on rehabilitative 
alimony.  In Ross v. Ross, the court emphasized that rehabilitative 
alimony could be used to produce economic parity.36  “[Rehabilitative 
alimony] may be appropriate where a husband and wife of comparable 
professional and economic status divorce.  In these circumstances, a 
limited term award would permit a spouse who had discontinued a career 
to resume it, and thereafter each independently could approximate the 
marital standard of living.”37  By the next decade, public outcry would 
move the alimony dialogue away from a focus on equality, and toward a 
goal of financial independence.38 
C.  The Rise of the Alimony Reform Movement 
During 2011, special interest groups, attorneys, and politicians alike 
demanded alimony reform.  This subsection will chronicle their efforts, 
culminating in the passage of the Alimony Reform Act.  Two very 
public proponents of alimony reform were Steven Hitner and his second 
 
32. See Ross v. Ross, 734 N.E.2d 1192, 1195-96 (Mass. 2000) (discussing the 
possibility of limited term alimony under the 1974 statute); Heins v. Ledis, 664 N.E.2d 10, 16 
n.4 (Mass. 1996) (stating that rehabilitative alimony is only appropriate when it is “relatively 
certain that financial support is needed only for a temporary period”). 
33. Bak v. Bak, 511 N.E.2d 625, 633 (Mass. 1987). 
34. Heins, 664 N.E.2d at 16 n.4. 
35. Id. 
36. Ross, 734 N.E.2d at 1195-6. 
37. Id. (citation omitted). 
38. See generally MASS. ALIMONY REFORM, supra note 31 (“Lifetime alimony is a 
violation of civil rights, harming both men and women.  End lifetime alimony, now!”). 
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wife Jeanie Hitner.39  Mr. Hitner was the President of the influential 
Massachusetts Alimony Reform, a lobbying organization comprised 
mostly of alimony-paying men.40  Mrs. Hitner co-founded the Second 
Wives and Partners Club.41  Together this couple and the groups they 
founded lobbied for legislative amendments to the alimony statute that 
would bring an end to what they viewed as unjustly long and 
inconsistent alimony awards.42 
The lobbying groups’ primary legislative goals included to 
“[s]upport self-sufficiency and independence for the lower-earning 
spouse . . . ; continu[e] alimony payments in special cases, and only until 
no longer needed; [e]nd lifelong alimony dependency, allowing each 
party . . . to move-on with independent lives; [and] [o]btain retirement 
rights for alimony payers . . . .”43 
These groups were joined with equal enthusiasm by a large portion 
of the Massachusetts legal community.  A joint Massachusetts Bar 
Association and Boston Bar Association alimony task force formed and 
made the first suggestion of a durational formula for general term 
alimony and the formal introduction of three additional types of alimony 
awards: rehabilitative, reimbursement, and transitional.44  Following the 
recommendations of the joint task force, the Legislature’s Judiciary 
Committee established their own task force.45 
The legislative task force was comprised of fourteen members, 
including legislators, attorneys, and Steve Hitner, who collaborated to 




41. Jennifer Levitz, The New Art of Alimony, WALL ST. J., Oct. 31, 2009, http://online 
.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052748703399204574505700448957522?mg=reno64-
wsj; Jess Bidgood, Alimony in Massachusetts Gets Overhaul, With Limits, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 
26, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/27/us/massachusetts-curbs-lifetime-alimony-
payments.html. 
42. MASS. ALIMONY REFORM, supra note 31.  In a statement to the New York Times, 
Hitner said that “[the old alimony law] put a lot of people in the poorhouse” and that “[i]t 
made people never able to retire.”  Bidgood, supra note 41. 
43. MASS. ALIMONY REFORM, supra note 31. 
44. MASS. ALIMONY REFORM, supra note 31. 
45. Press Release, Gale Candaras, State Senator, Candaras and Fernandes File Alimony 
Reform Measure (Jan. 18, 2011) [hereinafter Press Release], available at http://www.massali 
monyreform.org/PDFs/Candaras_Fernandes_Alimony-Reform-Press-Release.pdf.; see also 
WE DID IT!, MASS. ALIMONY REFORM, http://www.massalimonyreform.org/ (last visited 
May 14, 2014). 
46. See supra note 45 and sources cited therein.  As Mr. Hitner described the task force 
experience, “[n]obody compromised on this . . . . Compromise means people gave things up.  
We came up with a solution, the way the system was designed to work.”  Christina P. O’Neill, 
Alimony for the Real World, MASS. LAW. J. (Nov. 2011), available at 
http://www.massbar.org/publications/lawyers-journal/201 
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focused on clear definitions and durational limits for four types of 
alimony.47  The proposal also terminated general alimony at retirement, 
ended alimony when the recipient spouse cohabitated with a new 
partner, and created a new list of factors to consider when determining 
an alimony order.48 
Massachusetts Bar Association President, Denise Squillante, who 
sat on the task force, was a powerful champion for the new bill.  At a 
legislative hearing, Attorney Squillante stated: 
Families should no longer have to . . . be faced with confusing and 
obsolete laws, which exacerbate[] conflict, ultimately hurting 
families. . . . While providing for some predictability, this bill is 
flexible and comprehensive enough to give judges a critical 
opportunity to craft decisions that will be in the best interest of 
families.49 
Arguments such as these were highly convincing to the Legislature, 
and the Alimony Reform Act was unanimously passed by both the 
Massachusetts Senate and House of Representatives.50  On September 
26, 2011 the new alimony reform was signed in to law, relatively 
unchanged from the task force’s proposals.51  The law was celebrated 
across the state.  Headlines read “Alimony Reform in Mass. Ends Pay 
Until Death”52 and “Gov. Patrick OKs ‘Sweeping Overhaul’ of 
Massachusetts Alimony Laws.”53  Groups such as Massachusetts 
Alimony Reform joyously exclaimed “We did it!”54 
However, not everyone was equally excited about the changes to 
alimony reform.  Wendy Murphy, a law professor at New England Law 
of Boston, was concerned about the potential effects that the law could 




47. See Press Release, supra note 45. 
48. See Press Release, supra note 45. 
49. Mass. Bar Ass’n, MBA Leaders Urge Passage of Alimony Reform Act, MASS. LAW. 
J. (June 2011), http://www.massbar.org/publications/lawyers-journal/2011/june/mba-leaders-
urge-passage-of-alimony-reform-act. 
50. S. 665, 187th Gen. Ct. (Mass. 2011), available at https://malegislature.gov/Bills/18 
7/Senate/S665; H.R. 3617, 187th Gen. Ct. (Mass. 2011), available at https://malegislature.gov 
/Bills/187/House/H3617. 
51. Bidgood, supra note 41. 
52. Cheryl Wetzstein, Alimony Reform in Mass. Ends Pay Until Death, WASH., Sept. 
26, 2011, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/sep/26/alimony-reform-in-massachuse 
tts-ends-pay-until-dea/. 
53. Flynn, supra note 2. 
54. MASS. ALIMONY REFORM, supra note 31. 
JULIE-ANNE GERAGHTY STEBBINS   
2014] REHABILITATION ILLUSION 415 
families.55  Professor Murphy voiced her concern to the New York 
Times, stating “[i]t’s arbitrary to have cutoff periods that effectively 
make it harder for . . . opportunity loss to be valued in the divorce.”56  
She was also concerned that the rigid guidelines would replace judicial 
discretion entirely, saying: “I’m worried that the hard lines that have 
been drawn will become the rule.”57 
Attorney Gerald Nissenbaum, a divorce lawyer from Boston and 
“former president of the International Academy of Matrimonial 
Lawyers, called the bill ‘mean-spirited and Draconian’ because the limits 
it puts on alimony are ‘too strict.’”58  Like Professor Murphy, Attorney 
Nissenbaum was concerned that the reform would be detrimental to 
spouses who made sacrifices in a marriage.59  Moreover, Attorney 
Nissenbaum believed that the wording of the bill needed to be clarified, 
stating: “[w]hether you like the bill or not, it should be done in a way 
where the language is clear, the terms are clear, and designed in a way to 
avoid a lot of litigation.”60 
D.  Current Alimony Laws in Massachusetts 
While attorneys continue to debate the clarity of the terms included 
in alimony reform, one thing is clear: the new law creates major changes 
for alimony in Massachusetts.  As the Task Force recommended, the 
statute now recognizes four different types of alimony: general term, 
rehabilitative, reimbursement, and transitional.61  Across all types of 
alimony, the legislature focused on two factors: retirement and length of 
the marriage.62  Alimony is generally defined as “payment of support 
from a spouse, who has the ability to pay, to a spouse in need of support 
for a reasonable length of time.”63 
In contrast to the very broad grant of judicial discretion in the 1974 
 
55. Bidgood, supra note 41. 
56. Bidgood, supra note 41.  
57. Bidgood, supra note 41. 
58. Martine Powers, Legislation Overhauls Bay State Alimony Laws, BOS. GLOBE, Sept. 




61. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.ch. 208, § 48 (2007 & Supp. 2013). 
62. Id. 
63. Id.  That reasonable length of time appears to be largely dictated by the length of the 
marriage.  Length of marriage, for purposes of alimony distribution, is determined by “the 
number of months from the date of legal marriage to the date of service of a complaint or 
petition for divorce.”  Id.  However, the court has the discretion to increase the length of 
marriage to include economic partnerships that began during cohabitation prior to legal 
marriage.  Id. 
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version,64 general term alimony is now distributed based on a tiered 
system for marriages lasting less than twenty years.65  The statute 
terminates general term alimony payments upon the remarriage of the 
recipient or the death of either spouse, and, in notable addition, the 
cohabitation of the recipient spouse with a new partner for longer than 
three months, or when the payor spouse attains full retirement age.66  
Alimony awarded for any initial length of time is modifiable by either 
party upon a showing of a material change in circumstance.67 
When general term alimony is not awarded, the courts still have 
three other options for short term support.  Reimbursement alimony is 
most appropriate as a type of repayment for economic (or noneconomic) 
investments made by one spouse for the benefit of another, when the 
marriage lasted for less than five years.68  Transitional alimony, on the 
other hand, is not a form of repayment, but is rather an intermediary tool 
to help recipient spouses adjust to a new lifestyle or location following a 
divorce of a marriage lasting less than five years.69 
Reimbursement and transitional alimony compensate for 
contributions to a marriage that does not exceed five years.70  
Rehabilitative alimony is unique.  Unlike reimbursement and transitional 
alimony, rehabilitative alimony may be awarded for a marriage lasting 
more than five years.71  Rehabilitative alimony is also unlike 
reimbursement and transitional alimony because the recipients are 
presumably not self-sufficient at the time the award is made.72  
Rehabilitative alimony is not awarded to compensate recipients for their 
contributions in a marriage; instead, it is focused on the goal of making a 
dependent spouse become a “self-sufficient” spouse.73  Short term 
 
64. ch. 208, § 34, as amended by Mass. St. 1974, c. 565, effective as amended through 
March 1, 2012. 
65. Id. § 48.  For example, marriages of less than five years are eligible for general term 
alimony for a maximum number of one-half the number of months of the marriage.  See 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.ch. 208, § 49 (2007 & Supp. 2013) for a complete listing of alimony 
durations by length of marriage.  However, it should be noted that recipient spouses from 
marriages of any length of time do retain a right to petition the court to deviate from these 
time limits in the interest of justice.  Id. § 49(b).  Any deviations must be made upon written 
findings of the court supported by clear and convincing evidence.  Id. § 49(f)(2); see also id. § 
53(e).   
66. Id. § 49(a), (d), (f). 
67. Id. § 49(d). 
68. Id. § 48 (for example, when a recipient spouse enabled the payor spouse to complete 
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payment is awarded here so that the recipient spouse may re-enter the 
workforce or complete job training and may begin to move from 
economic dependence on his/her former spouse to self-sufficiency.74 
As with general term alimony, rehabilitative alimony is terminated 
upon the remarriage of a recipient spouse and is modifiable based on a 
material change in circumstance.75  Rehabilitative alimony is not 
intended to last longer than five years.76  However, it may be extended 
provided that the recipient spouse demonstrates “compelling 
circumstances . . . that unforeseen events prevent the recipient spouse 
from being self-supporting at the end of the term . . . the court finds that 
the recipient tried to become self-supporting; and the payor is able to pay 
without undue burden.”77 
The statute provides the courts with guidance when making their 
determinations as to which form of alimony is most appropriate in a 
given case.78  The most relevant considerations for rehabilitative alimony 
awards include: the age and health of the parties, employability of the 
parties (including potential employability through additional training), 
economic and non-economic contributions during the marriage, and lost 
economic opportunity as a result of the marriage.79  Even with these 
statutory guidelines, it still remains unseen how the courts will apply 
them when it comes to determining whether a rehabilitative alimony 
recipient is “self-sufficient.” 
II.  SOUTHERN SELF-SUFFICIENCY: A STUDY IN INTERPRETATIONS 
Determining when an alimony recipient is eligible for rehabilitative 
alimony can be tricky business.  Jurisdictions vary greatly in their 
interpretations of “self-sufficiency,”80 and consequently, provide 
rehabilitative alimony or general term alimony in very different 
situations.81  Section A will compare two interpretations at opposite ends 
of the spectrum: Tennessee uses a standard of post-divorce economic 
parity while Texas promotes only the achievement of minimum 
 
74. Id. 
75. Id. § 50. 
76. Id. § 50 (b). 
77. Id.  Notably, rehabilitative alimony may also begin upon the termination of a child 
support award.  Id. § 53 (g). 
78. Id. § 53. 
79. Id. § 53(a). 
80. See generally Mary Frances Lyle & Jeffrey L. Levy, From Riches to Rags: Does 
Rehabilitative Alimony Need to Be Rehabilitated?, 38 FAM. L.Q. 3, 14-15 (2004) (discussing 
examples of self-sufficiency in alimony statutes throughout the country). 
81. Id. at 12-19 (comparing statutory approaches, such as broad judicial discretion and 
specific bars from receiving support). 
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reasonable needs.  Section B focuses on the similarities between 
Tennessee’s interpretation and the decisions of the Massachusetts courts 
before alimony reform and makes the observation that they are less 
likely to do so now, without a statutory amendment defining self-
sufficiency. 
A. The Unequal Application of “Self-Sufficiency” 
Rehabilitative alimony is common, and can be found across most 
jurisdictions in the United States.82  However, there are stark differences 
in what these jurisdictions hope to achieve through a rehabilitative 
alimony award.  Statutes vary from bare minimum survival to assuring 
post-divorce equality.83  This Section will examine statutes in Texas and 
Tennessee to analyze the spectrum of interpretations of “self-
sufficiency” and the impact of those interpretations. 
1. Texas: The Lone Divorcée State 
In Texas, independence reigns over family court.  There is a 
rebuttable statutory presumption against maintenance84 and a strong 
preference to award short term alimony over longer, general term 
alimony awards.85  The result is an interpretation of self-sufficiency that 
is akin to mere subsistence.86  While Texas does not use the label 
“rehabilitative” in its statute, it is clear that the application meets the 
traditional definition of rehabilitative alimony (short term alimony that 
ceases when the recipient becomes self-supporting).87 
In all Texas alimony awards, the maintenance order is limited “to 
the shortest reasonable period that allows the spouse seeking 
maintenance to earn sufficient income to provide for the spouse’s 
minimum reasonable needs . . . .”88  The rehabilitation period is brief, 
generally limited to no more than five years for marriages that last as 
long as nineteen years.89  The only exceptions are major obstacles to 
 
82. See id. at 12-16 (discussing rehabilitative alimony in numerous jurisdictions 
throughout the U.S.). 
83. Compare TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 8.054 (West 2006 & Supp. 2012), with TENN. 
CODE ANN. § 36-5-121(c)(2) (2010). 
84. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 8.053(a).  An alimony-seeking spouse may overcome this 
presumption by “exercise[ing] diligence in (1) earning sufficient income. . . or (2) developing 
the necessary skills.”  Id. 
85. Id. § 8.054. 
86. Id. § 8.053. 
87. Id.; David H. Kelsey & Patrick P. Fry, The Relationship Between Permanent and 
Rehabilitative Alimony, 4 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL LAW 1, *2 (1988). 
88. § 8.054 (emphasis added). 
89. Id. § 8.054(a)(1). 
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employment, such as physical or mental disabilities, duties as the 
custodian of a child, or other “compelling impediment[s] to earning 
sufficient income to provide for the spouse’s minimum reasonable 
needs.”90 
Neither the legislature nor Texas case law provides a bright-line 
definition of “minimum reasonable needs.”91  However, some case 
interpretations paint a grim picture.  In Carlin v. Carlin, a former wife 
was denied a motion to extend her alimony award for failure to establish 
an incapacitating disability that prevented her from supporting herself 
through appropriate employment.92 
During the marriage, the wife developed rheumatoid arthritis, which 
was the original basis for her three-year alimony award.93  It was the 
wife’s burden to prove that her disability continued to prevent her from 
seeking employment, in order to extend her alimony.94  At the time of 
the trial, she was employed part-time as a bookkeeper, making six 
dollars an hour.95  At trial, she testified that: “[T]he main reason I 
haven’t sought work was because of my mother, and since I’ve sought to 
put her in a nursing home I haven’t felt comfortable just leaving her all 
the time.”96  She also testified that because of her arthritis: “I don’t think 
I would be able to hold down a full time [job] 5 days a week . . . for a 
whole year.”97 
The reviewing court held that “the trial court abused its discretion 
in ruling that [the wife’s] spousal maintenance should continue.”98  The 
court reasoned that while there was evidence that the wife was suffering 
from arthritis, she was not “incapacitated” because she was able to drive, 
cook, clean, and provide for her ailing mother.99  The wife in the Carlin 
case suffered from a painful degenerative disease, made six dollars an 
hour part-time, and cared for her elderly mother.100  Despite all these 
factors, Texas found that she was not incapacitated enough to continue to 
receive alimony.101  In Texas, financial independence is the ultimate goal 
 
90. Id. § 8.054(2). 
91. In re Marriage of Hale, 975 S.W.2d 694, 698 (Tex. App. 1998) (“[d]eciding what 
the minimum reasonable need is for a particular individual or family is a fact-specific 
determination . . . ” and should be made on a case-by-case basis). 
92. 92 S.W.3d 902, 911 (Tex. 2002). 
93. Id. at 903. 
94. Id. 
95. Id. at 909. 
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for post-divorce proceedings. 
The Texas courts have not ruled out the possibility that minimum 
wage may constitute self-sufficiency in some circumstances,102 despite 
the fact that minimum wage jobs are not adequate to meet many 
minimum reasonable needs.103  At least ten million people in this country 
work and are below the U.S. poverty line.104  Yet, in Gordon v. Gordon, 
rehabilitative alimony was awarded to a fifty-year-old woman who was 
out of the workforce for twenty years.105  She made $15,000 annually, in 
comparison to the $100,000 her husband was making.106  The wife had a 
master’s degree in business, which she forewent utilizing in order to be a 
caregiver for their two children, including a diabetic child who required 
frequent doctors appointments.107  Despite her long absence from the 
workforce and the significant difference between the parties’ earning 
capacities, the court still affirmed a mere three-year award.108 
It’s unfair to expect a fifty-year-old woman, absent from the 
workforce for twenty years and caring for a diabetic child, to close an 
$85,000 spousal income gap in three years.  Through this holding, Texas 
courts reiterated the goal for alimony awards: the recipient to meet her 
own “minimum reasonable needs.”109  Texas courts upheld independence 
over economic parity. 
2. Tennessee: Clarity for Caregivers 
At the other end of the self-sufficiency spectrum is the state of 
Tennessee.  Tennessee is an example of a state that has corrected its path 
to prevent caregiving from becoming a marital liability.110  In earlier 
case law, Tennessee courts upheld an interpretation of self-sufficiency 
that left both parties similarly situated economically.  For example, in 
 
102. In re Marriage of Hale, 975 S.W.2d at 698 (“We are unwilling to hold that 
minimum wage is adequate in every case.”).  Notably, this is a different statement than ruling 
that minimum wage is inadequate for self-sufficiency. 
103. Chris Isidore, Not Getting by on Minimum Wage, CNN MONEY (Sept. 27, 2011, 
9:39 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2011/09/27/news/economy/minimum_wage_jobs/index.htm 
(“About 20% of American adults who have jobs are earning only $10.65 an hour or less . . . . 
Even at 40 hours a week, that amounts to less than $22,314, the poverty level for a family of 
four.”). 
104. Bill Quigley, Working and Poor in the USA, CTR. FOR CONST. RTS., http://ccrjusti 
ce.org/working-and-poor-usa. 
105. No. 14-10-01031-CV, 2011 WL 5926723, at *3-4 (Tex. App. Nov. 29, 2011). 
106. Id. 
107. Id. 
108. Id. at *9. 
109. Id. at *5. 
110. Lyle & Levy, supra note 80, at 19-27. 
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Aaron v. Aaron,111 the court found that “[t]he combined talents and 
efforts of the Aarons enabled them to enjoy a relatively high standard of 
living.”112  The court held that the wife could not be rehabilitated 
because “the real need of the spouse seeking support is the single most 
important factor” and that “the amount of alimony should be determined 
so ‘that the party obtaining the divorce [is not] left in a worse financial 
situation than he or she had before . . . the divorce.’”113  The court 
explained its interpretation by stating that “[w]hile alimony is not 
intended to provide a former spouse with relative financial ease, we 
stress that alimony should be awarded in such a way that the spouses 
approach equity.”114 
This parity-based approach to alimony was reiterated in the 2000 
case, Crabtree v. Crabtree, where the court answered the question: how 
do we know whether a spouse can be “rehabilitated”?115  The answer 
was that “the parties’ standard of living should be the measuring stick by 
which and against which a court determines whether or not an individual 
can be rehabilitated.”116  However, shortly after that ruling, the tide 
turned in Tennessee. 
Tennessee went through a period that resulted in rulings that were 
far from equitable.  In Goldberg v. Goldberg, the court referred to the 
parties’ relative earning capacity and standard of living as factors to be 
given only “marginal relevance” as to rehabilitation.117  Instead, the new 
focus was “whether the obligee spouse can earn enough money to be 
self-sufficient, even if at a level far below the parties’ former standard of 
living and even if the earning capacity of the obligor spouse is far 
greater.”118 
This ruling caused uproar from groups such as the Tennessee 
Women’s Political Caucus and the Tennessee Bar Association.119  
Through the lobbying efforts of these groups, the Tennessee alimony 
 
111. 909 S.W.2d 408 (Tenn. 1995). 
112. Id. at 409. 
113. Id. (citing Shackleford v. Shackleford, 611 S.W.2d 598, 601 (Tenn. Ct. App. 
1980)). 
114. Id. at 411. 
115. See 16 S.W.3d 356, 358 (Tenn. 2000), superseded by statute, TENN. CODE ANN. § 
36–5–121(c)(2) (referring to the statutory guidelines for determining the form and length of a 
support award). 
116. Robertson v. Robertson, No. E2000-01698-COA-RM-CV, 2000 WL 1211314, at 
*2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 25, 2000), aff’d, 76 S.W.3d 337 (Tenn. 2002). 
117. Goldberg v. Goldberg, No. M2001-01442-COA-R3-CV, 2003 WL 132460, at *5 
(Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 16, 2003). 
118. Id. 
119. Lyle & Levy, supra note 80, at 25. 
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laws were amended to correct the court’s interpretation that 
rehabilitative alimony could result in large wealth disparities between 
the parties.120  The court in Wisner v. Wisner, commented on this return 
to equity: 
[I]n an apparent response to the difficulties presented by the 
Crabtree and Robertson decisions, Tennessee’s legislature 
substantially revised the alimony statutes . . . .  
. . . .  
. . . [T]he parties’ standard of living during the marriage and the 
post-divorce standard of living for the other spouse, while certainly 
not the only consideration, were adopted by the Legislature as the 
basic “measuring sticks” in alimony decisions with respect to an 
economically disadvantaged spouse.121 
As Tennessee laws now stand, there is a very clear articulation of 
the state’s esteem for the unpaid contributions of caregivers.  The 
preamble to the alimony laws states: 
Spouses have traditionally strengthened the family unit through 
private arrangements whereby one (1) spouse focuses on nurturing 
the personal side of the marriage, including the care and nurturing of 
the children, while the other spouse focuses primarily on building the 
economic strength of the family unit.  This arrangement often results 
in economic detriment to the spouse who subordinated such spouse’s 
own personal career for the benefit of the marriage.  It is the public 
policy of this state to encourage and support marriage, and to 
encourage family arrangements that provide for the rearing of 
healthy and productive children who will become healthy and 
productive citizens . . . .122 
Specifically, the statute defines rehabilitation in terms of equity 
between the parties, stating that the legislature’s purpose was for: 
[A] spouse, who is economically disadvantaged relative to the other 
spouse, [to] be rehabilitated, whenever possible, by the granting of 
an order for payment of rehabilitative alimony.  To be rehabilitated 
means to achieve, with reasonable effort, an earning capacity that 
will permit the economically disadvantaged spouse’s standard of 
living after the divorce to be reasonably comparable to the standard 
of living enjoyed during the marriage, or to the post-divorce standard 
 
120. TENN. ECON. COUNCIL ON WOMEN, ACHIEVING AN EQUALLY GENDERED 
GOVERNMENT: THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF WOMEN’S POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN 
TENNESSEE 32 (2007), available at http://www.tn.gov/sos/ecw/Achieving%20an%2 
0Equally%20Gendered%20Government.pdf. 
121. 339 S.W.3d 1, 16-17 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2010). 
122. TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-5-121(c)(1) (2010). 
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of living expected to be available to the other spouse, considering the 
relevant statutory factors and the equities between the parties.123 
In Tennessee, if rehabilitation is not feasible or would result in an 
economic disadvantage to one party, then the court may grant the 
equivalent of general term alimony.124  This provides greater clarity for 
the Tennessee courts when deciding whether or not a recipient may be 
rehabilitated.125  Without similar language, Massachusetts courts cannot 
easily discern when rehabilitative alimony should be awarded and when 
general term alimony would be more appropriate. 
B.  Alimony Reform in Massachusetts, a Predictable Cost 
Prior to the Alimony Reform movement, Massachusetts rulings 
looked more like Tennessee than Texas.  In Ross v. Ross, the wife left 
the workforce to care for the couples’ two daughters.  During the 
marriage the husband’s income exceeded $500,000.126  The judge in this 
case considered an award of rehabilitative alimony stating that “[s]uch 
an award may be appropriate where a husband and wife of comparable 
professional and economic status divorce.  In these circumstances, a 
limited term award would permit a spouse who had discontinued a career 
to resume it, and thereafter each independently could approximate the 
marital standard of living.”127  However, the judge declined to award 
rehabilitative alimony in that case because the wife’s potential earning 
capacity was between $15,000 and $20,000 per year and would be 
insufficient to provide for herself and her children in the manner to 
which they had become accustomed.128 
In Kowalska-Davis v. Davis, decided just weeks before the Reform 
Act took effect, the Massachusetts Appeals Court affirmed an award for 
permanent alimony, despite the husband’s argument that the wife was 
“underemployed.”129  The court took into consideration the wife’s age at 
the time the divorce, and noted “her absence from the workforce for over 
eleven years, and her limited future opportunities,”130 although the wife 
 
123. Id. § 36-5-121(d)(2). 
124. Id. § 36-5-121(d)(3). 
125. See Edwards v. Edwards, No. W2011-02305-COA-R3-CV, 2012 WL 6197079, at 
*11 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 12, 2012) (appeal to provide rehabilitative alimony denied, although 
wife had a master’s degree, in part because “[w]ife is nearing retirement age with neither 
retirement funds nor the earning ability possessed by Husband”). 
126. Ross v. Ross, 734 N.E.2d 1192, 1194 (Mass. 2000). 
127. Id. at 1195-6. 
128. Id. at 1196. 
129. See Kowalska-Davis v. Davis, No. 10–P–2191, slip op. at 2 (Mass. App. Ct. Feb. 
27, 2012). 
130. Id. 
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held an MBA and previously worked as a marketing director.131 
Now, it is less certain that the courts in Massachusetts would come 
to a similar decision.  The clear objective of the Massachusetts Bar 
Association and the legislature is to make alimony more predictable.132  
But predictability should not come at the cost of economic justice. 
III.  A LITTLE DEARER THAN HIS HORSE:133 
ACKNOWLEDGING CAREGIVING WORK WHILE MAINTAINING 
AUTONOMY 
The cost of predictable alimony statutes cannot be to create a 
windfall for spouses who worked outside of the home, and a failure to 
compensate for caregiving spouses.  Given the life-long career and 
financial consequences that women face for being parents,134  
Massachusetts is in need of an interpretation of rehabilitative alimony 
that prevents punishing mothers. 
This Section recommends that the Massachusetts legislature amend 
the Alimony Reform Act to explicitly address the contributions made by 
caregivers and to create a standard of “self-sufficiency” that 
approximates the payor spouse’s post-divorce standard of living.  
Section A will recommend specific language for the Massachusetts 
legislature to use in such an amendment, using the successful Tennessee 
statute as an example.  Section B will describe the economic factors that 
make it imperative that the rehabilitative alimony statute ensure  mothers 
are not left financially crippled after their marriage.  Section C will 
address the concerns for payor spouses and clarify the non-punitive 
nature of this amendment.  Lastly, Section D will discuss the ways in 
which predictability in the court may be maintained by clarifying the 
standard by which recipient spouses will be considered rehabilitated. 
A.  Amending the Great Alimony Reformation: A Recommendation for 
the Massachusetts Legislature 
Massachusetts must expand its legislation to provide the courts with 
absolute certainty that contributions to the marriage and home are highly 
 
131. Id. at 2 n.6. 
132. Flynn, supra note 2. 
133. Lord Alfred Tennyson, Locksley Hall, in THE WORKS OF ALFRED TENNYSON: 
LOCKSLEY HALL AND OTHER POEMS 41, 46 (referring to the relationship between husband 
and wife, “[s]omething better than his dog, a littler dearer than his horse”). 
134. See generally KARINE MOE & DIANNA SHANDY, GLASS CEILINGS AND 100-HOUR 
COUPLES: WHAT THE OPT-OUT PHENOMENON CAN TEACH US ABOUT WORK AND FAMILY 
52-55 (Univ. of Ga. Press 2010) (discussing the career long consequences of being “mommy 
tracked”). 
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valued.  The current language is not sufficient.  Considerations for non-
economic contributions to the home and career sacrifices are folded into 
a laundry list of factors for the assignment of alimony.135  Those 
considerations are still unclear, particularly in comparison with the 
guidelines set out in other areas of the Act.136  Moreover, without more 
statutory guidance, rehabilitative alimony awards are susceptible to a 
wide range of interpretations, defeating the legislative goal of 
predictability for divorce cases. 
Looking at the missteps of other jurisdictions, the need for a 
statutory amendment is clear.137  Without a statutory definition of self-
sufficiency, Massachusetts is in danger of falling prey to the same 
mistakes.  This Section recommends an amendment that plainly 
articulates the importance of unpaid caregiving.  Tennessee provides an 
excellent model, and Massachusetts would be wise to adopt similar 
language, such as: 
Massachusetts recognizes the value of unpaid caregiving work in the 
home, both to the family that is nurtured and to the Commonwealth 
as a whole.  Such caregiving often results in the economic detriment 
to the spouse who subordinated his or her own personal career for 
the benefit of the marriage.  With these sacrifices in mind, a spouse, 
who is economically disadvantaged relative to the other spouse, 
should be rehabilitated, whenever possible, by the granting of an 
order for payment of rehabilitative alimony.  To be rehabilitated 
means to achieve, with reasonable effort, an earning capacity that 
will permit the economically disadvantaged spouse’s standard of 
living after the divorce to be reasonably comparable to the standard 
of living enjoyed during the marriage, or to the post-divorce standard 
of living expected to be available to the other spouse, considering the 
relevant statutory factors and the equities between the parties.138 
The importance of this recommendation goes beyond predictability 
for the courts; it articulates a legislative appreciation for the role that 
caregiving plays in producing a functional state.  The community value 
of parenting is widespread:139 
 
135. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 208, § 34 (2007 & Supp. 2013). 
136. Id. § 50.  For example, the timetables for determining general term alimony are 
unprecedented in their clarity and detail. 
137. See supra Part II.A.2 (chronicling the outcry over subsistence level rehabilitation 
awards in Tennessee). 
138. Largely modeled after TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-5-121(d)(2) (2010). 
139. See, e.g., NANCY FOLBRE, VALUING CHILDREN: RETHINKING THE ECONOMICS OF 
THE FAMILY 13-16 (an examination of the economic value of children, describing the circular 
flow exchange among households, businesses, and government, and noting:  “If parents were 
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Parents who raise happy, healthy, and successful children create an 
especially important public good.  Children themselves are not the 
only beneficiaries.  Employers profit from access to productive 
workers.  The elderly benefit from Social Security taxes paid by the 
younger generation . . . .Fellow citizens gain from having productive 
and law-abiding neighbors.140 
Economists term these societal benefits “positive externalities”— 
benefits enjoyed by all members of the community in addition to the 
individual parent’s decision to provide care.141  By adopting language 
such as that recommended above, the Commonwealth will be able to 
support the positive externality of caregiving without failing to 
acknowledge that economics for women are often not the same as for 
men. 
B. Women’s Rights Backlash: The Illusion Which Works an Injustice 
The women’s rights movement of the 1960s and 1970s brought 
thousands of new, working women into the workforce.142  Undeniably, 
women have enjoyed a larger share in the country’s marketplace over the 
past fifty years.143  However, one of the dangers accompanying this 
unprecedented achievement is the assumption that women and men are 
now similarly situated economically.144  This section sets out to dispel 
this misconception that may cause economic injury to caregivers in 
Massachusetts. 
Prior to the Alimony Reform Act, Massachusetts courts were 
 
unable or unwilling to raise children, the households that buy and sell services in the 
marketplace would eventually dwindle and disappear”). 
140. NANCY FOLBRE, THE INVISIBLE HEART: ECONOMICS AND FAMILY VALUES 50 
(The New Press 2001). 
141. Id.  
142. Mitra Toossi, A Century of Change: the U.S. Labor Force, 1950-2050, MONTHLY 
LAB. REV. (May 2002), http://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2002/05/art2full.pdf. 
143. Female Power, THE ECONOMIST (Dec. 30, 2009). 
http://www.economist.com/node/15174418; MOE & SHANDY, supra note 135, at 12 (“Let’s be 
clear at the outset: women have always worked, just not always for pay.”). 
144. See, e.g., ANN CRITTENDEN, THE PRICE OF MOTHERHOOD: WHY THE MOST 
IMPORTANT JOB IN THE WORLD IS STILL THE LEAST VALUED 13 (Metropolitan Books 2001) 
(“One of the misleading impressions left in the wake of the women’s movement is that it 
swept away women’s traditional lives, like a sandstorm burying the artifacts of an ancient 
civilization . . . . The truth, as always, is far more complicated.”); MOE & SHANDY, supra note 
135, at 45-55 (discussing the career-long consequences of being “mommy tracked”). 
When young women graduate from college today, they expect that they will enter 
into the labor market on the same terms as men.  They expect to be able to hold the 
same jobs as men, and to earn similar salaries as well. . . . In fact, women experience 
the labor market differently from men, in both explicit and tacit ways, and these 
differences in experiences have dramatic effects on women’s economic position. 
MOE & SHANDY, supra note 135, at 45. 
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suspicious of rehabilitative alimony; in part for fear that it could not 
bring equality to the parties.145  In Zildjian v. Zildjian, decided in 1979, 
the judge surmised that rehabilitative alimony could be possible for 
couples with “comparable professional and economic status.”146  
However, the court was still suspicious: “[t]he phrase ‘rehabilitative 
alimony’ has a certain attraction, for it suggests an equality of economic 
opportunity between the sexes.  But such an equality may be illusory in a 
concrete case, and under such circumstances an attempt to apply the 
notion may work an injustice.”147 
In many ways, economic equality between men and women remains 
illusory.148  There is ample evidence of real barriers to women’s 
economic success.  In the United States, women and men are still not 
paid the same wage for the exact same work.149  For women of color, the 
wage gap grows: from $0.81 cents on the dollar to a startling $0.68 cents 
for African-American women, and a horrifying $0.59 for Hispanic 
women.150  On average, over her lifetime, a woman will earn between 
$700,000 to $2,000,000 less than a man with a comparative level of 
education.151 
While the new alimony statutes do take into consideration factors 
such as occupation, vocational skills, employability, and the 
contributions of the parties as homemakers to the family unit,152 it is 
unlikely that the courts will be able to pursue predictability while also 
fully addressing issues of gender equality.  In part, this is because gender 
inequalities are hard to identify.  Gender discrimination in the work 
place often goes unnoticed because it looks “normal.”153  Among the 
 
145. See supra Part II.B. 
146. 391 N.E.2d. 697, 705 (Mass. App. Ct. 1979). 
147. Id. at 706. 
148. THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF ECONOMIC INEQUALITY 290-312 (Wiemer Salverda, 
Brian Nolan & Timothy M. Smeeding eds., 2009) (analyzing world-wide trends in pay 
inequity: “[s]eparate pay rates for men and women . . . are now illegal, and have been for half 
a century in the developed world. But the gender pay gap survives universally”). 
149. Latifa Lyles, Women of Color: An Economic Snapshot, (WORK IN PROGRESS) 
OFFICIAL BLOG OF THE U.S. DEP’T OF LAB. (Nov. 16, 2013), http://social.dol.gov/blog/wome 
n-of-color-an-economic-snapshot/. 
150. Id. 
151. What Are the Costs of the Wage Gap?, THE WAGE PROJECT, http://www.wagepro 
ject.org/files/costs.php (last visited May 14, 2014) (stating that a woman who graduates high 
school will make $700,000 less over her lifetime, a woman who graduates college will make 
$1,200,000 less than a college educated man over her lifetime, and that a professional school 
graduate will make $2,000,000 less than her male counterparts over her lifetime). 
152. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 208, § 34 (2007 & Supp. 2013). 
153. For example, “although sexual harassment law has provided some protection for 
women in the workplace, the sexual objectification of women in the broader culture has 
increased significantly and is being increasingly internalized by girls and women.”  CARRIE N. 
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Fortune 500 companies, only 18 are led by women CEOs—that is just 
3.6%.154  Women don’t just lag at the top of the business world; women 
are underrepresented at the managerial level across all sectors.155 
According to economists, “[n]ot only do women earn less for 
similar work, they also do more work for no pay at all.”156  Unpaid work 
includes child care, cooking and cleaning, services that would cost 
families tens of thousands of dollars if they had to pay another person to 
perform them.157  Additionally, the kind of work that women are more 
likely to participate in tends to be underpaid.158  Elementary education, 
special education, social work, and child and family studies are ranked 
among the lowest paying college degrees in the United States.159 
There are those who argue that low paying work, like unpaid 
caregiving work, is a choice.160  But even completely autonomous 
choices are not made in a vacuum. McArthur grant recipient and feminist 
economist, Nancy Folbre, accounts for the over-representation of women 
in caregiving roles in part because of societal pressure.  “[S]ocial norms 
have an important impact on women’s preferences, whether or not 
biological differences also come into play.  Women are strongly 
encouraged to adopt feminine values of care for others, whether they 
 
BAKER, THE WOMEN’S MOVEMENT AGAINST SEXUAL HARASSMENT 191 (Cambridge Univ. 
Press 2008). 
154. Bianca Bosker, Fortune 500 List Boasts More Female CEOs Than Ever Before, 
HUFFINGTON POST, May 7, 2012, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/05/07/fortune-500-
female-ceos_n_1495734.html. 
155. State-by-State Rankings and Date on Indicators of Women’s Social and Economic 
Status, 2010, INST. FOR WOMEN’S POLICY RESEARCH, available at http://www.iwpr.org/initia 
tives/states/state-by-state-rankings-data-2010 (showing low rates of women in managerial or 
professional occupations, in every state). 
156. Catherine Rampell, Women Lead in Unpaid Work, N.Y.TIMES ECONOMIX, (March 
10, 2011, 2:29 PM), http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/03/10/women-lead-in-unpaid-
work/; MOE & SHANDY, supra note 135, at 63 (“[M]arried mothers who work full-time do 
two-thirds of the housework and child care, and this approximately 1.8 times as much as full-
time employed married men.”). 
157. Investopedia, The Economics of Stay-at-Home-Moms, FORBES (May 10, 2011, 
11:55 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/investopedia/2011/05/10/the-economics-of-stay-at-
home-moms/ (“While it’s not an exact science, the calculator provided at Salary.com is a nice 
starting point for figuring out the currency value of a stay-at-home mom.”) (citing 2013 
What’s a Mom Worth Infographics, SALARY.COM, http://www.salary.com/2013-mom-
infographics/ (last visited May 14, 2014)). 
158. Nancy Folbre, Why Girly Jobs Don’t Pay Well, N.Y.TIMES ECONOMIX BLOG, 
(Aug. 16, 2010, 6:00 A.M.),  http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/08/16/why-girly-jobs-
dont-pay/. 
159. Id. 
160. Hilary Lips, WomensMedia, Beware Those Who Blame Gender Pay Gap on 
Women’s Choices, FORBES (Apr. 12, 2011, 5:50 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/womensm 
edia/2011/04/12/beware-those-who-blame-womens-choices-for-gender-pay-gap/. 
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prefer them or not.”161 
Moreover, in the absence of government subsidies for child 
rearing,162 many mothers are forced to choose between paying for 
expensive child care,163 which is often difficult to secure,164 and taking 
time out of their careers to care for their children.  “One of the worst 
kept secrets of the past two decades is the quiet exodus of highly trained 
women from corporations and the leading professional firms.”165  In 
recent years the number of college-educated, married mothers of infants 
in the labor force fell steeply, as did the number of married women with 
professional degrees and children under eighteen.166 
Unfortunately, even a small absence from the workforce can affect 
a woman’s earning capacity for the rest of her career.167  “Women who 
have interrupted their careers for whatever reason return to work at 
salaries that lag behind those of their female counterparts who remained 
in the workforce continuously.  A Center for Work-Life Policy study 
found that, overall, employed women who took time off suffered an 18 
percent wage penalty.”168  More highly educated, higher-earning women 
are more adversely affected by taking time out.169  All women are 
affected as Folbre has examined in her work, “[i]n an economy in which 
rewards are increasingly based upon performance in paid employment, 
 
161. Nancy Folbre, Reader Response: ‘Womanly’ Jobs and Low Pay, N.Y.TIMES 
ECONOMIX BLOG (August 18, 2010, 1:22 PM), http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/08/1 
8/reader-response-womanly-jobs-and-low-pay/; FOLBRE, supra note 139, at 32-33 (“One of 
the few surveys asking mothers how they actually felt found about 20 percent reported that 
they received little pleasure from [child rearing]—which, it is important to note, is not the 
same as saying they regretted having undertaken it.”). 
162. Nordic countries, for example, provide subsidized child care and “studies show 
that these policies lead to increases in female employment.”  MOE & SHANDY, supra note 135, 
at 80. 
163. “In the United States, a parent of an infant can expect to pay anywhere from 
$4,020 to $14,225 per-year for full-time center-based care . . . .”  MOE & SHANDY, supra note 
135, at 76. 
164. The United States is experiencing a serious shortage of licensed child care slots.  
“[T]he National Child Care Resource and Referral Agency reports that the working mothers of 
11.3 million children under the age of five regularly use some kind of child care.  At the same 
time, only 10.8 million legally operating slots exist, including those for school-age children.”  
MOE & SHANDY, supra note 135, at 74. 
165. CRITTENDEN, supra note 144, at 28.  
166. MOE & SHANDY, supra note 135, at 2 (citing that participation for college 
educated mothers of infants fell from 71% in 1997 to 63% in 2005, and that participation for 
mothers with professional degrees and children under eighteen fell from two-thirds to around 
half from 1998 to 2005). 
167. MOE & SHANDY, supra note 135, at 127-28 (discussing that wage penalties for 
caretaking trail women through their working lives). 
168. MOE & SHANDY, supra note 135, at 127-28. 
169. FOLBRE, supra note 139, at 13-16. 
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the costs and risks of parenthood are going up.”170 
It can fairly be said that women who become mothers put their 
careers and economic security at risk in ways that do not apply to 
fathers.171  Folbre’s research supports this conclusion: 
[M]otherhood tends to lower women’s earnings even if they don’t 
take much time out from paid work.  The more children a woman 
has, the less she earns, even if she works the same amount of time 
and remains with one employer for the same length of time as a 
childless woman. . . . What is interesting is that the numbers show 
exactly the opposite effect for fathers: having children increases 
men’s earnings.172 
During the economic decline of the past five years, the effect on 
working men has received widespread attention.173  However, the newest 
evidence reveals that it is actually working women who will be the most 
vulnerable in the years to come.  In The Myth of the Male Decline, 
Stephanie Coontz, family studies expert, analyzes the truth behind the 
hype, arguing that although “[w]omen’s real wages have been rising for 
decades, while the real wages of most men have stagnated or fallen.  But 
women’s wages started from a much lower base, artificially held down 
by discrimination.”174  The ongoing recovery from The Great Recession 
seems to be similarly misrepresented. 
As of June 2012, men  regained 46.2% of the jobs they lost since 
the start of the recession and women have regained 38.7% of the jobs 
they lost.175  Across industries, women have either lost proportionately 
more jobs or gained proportionately fewer jobs than men in the 
recovery.176  Quick recovery is unlikely for women.  Women are over-
represented in fields found in the public sector, which has steadily 
contracted during the recovery.177  Fields that employ more men, such as 
 
170. FOLBRE, supra note 140, at 33. 
171. See generally MOE & SHANDY, supra note 135, at 52-53 (recounting interviews 
with mothers who took short periods off from work at the birth of their children, but who were 
nevertheless “mommytracked” and denied access to the workload they were previously 
carrying). 
172. FOLBRE, supra note 140, at 34-35 (citing that “married mothers who work full-
time do two-thirds of the housework and child care . . . approximately 1.8 times as much as 
full-time employed married men.”); see also CRITTENDEN, supra note 144, at 25 (discussing 
that mothers experience higher absentee rates for taking time off to care for a sick child). 
173. Female Power, supra note 14. 
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construction and information, continue to grow.178 
These barriers to women’s, and especially mothers’, economic 
success are unlikely to change in the immediate future.  Systemic policy 
changes, such as federal paid maternity leave, are unlikely to take place 
when women are still so underrepresented at decision-making tables.  
Women make up a mere 26% of senior leadership roles across all 
government agencies.179  Women also represent only 26% of federal 
judgeships.180  These numbers are still better than the “record high” 
18.5% representation of women in U.S. Congress.181  Studies show that 
it will take until the year 2085 to close the leadership gap.182 
Given the reality of women’s economic standing and political 
underrepresentation, it seems illogical to base rehabilitative alimony 
awards on assumptions that self-sufficiency is universally obtainable 
within a few short years of re-training.  With an amendment, 
Massachusetts could assure that rehabilitative alimony is reserved for 
only those women who are well situated to achieve a version of self-
sufficiency equal to her former partner’s. 
C.  Replacement Costs and Reparations: The Cost of Caregiving 
One may wonder why a former husband, post-divorce, should be 
made to compensate his ex-spouse for the collateral damage of a sexist 




179. WHITE HOUSE PROJECT, BENCHMARKING WOMEN’S LEADERSHIP (2009), 
available at http://www.ncrw.org/sites/ncrw.org/files/benchmark_wom_leadership.pdf. 
180. Kim DeVigil, Women’s College Releases Results of National Leadership Study, U. 
DENV. (Nov. 1, 2012), http://www.du.edu/ascend/news-womens-college-releases-results-of-
national-leadership-study.html. 
181. Women in the U.S. Congress 2014, CTR. FOR AM. WOMEN AND POLITICS., 
http://www.cawp.rutgers.edu/fast_facts/levels_of_office/documents/cong.pdf (last visited May 
14, 2014). 
182. DeVigil, supra note 180. 
183. Male privilege, like white privilege, class privilege, and heteronormativity, are all 
part of the effects of a persistent patriarchy.  See generally ALLAN G. JOHNSON, THE GENDER 
KNOT: UNRAVELING OUR PATRIARCHAL LEGACY 5 (Temple Univ. Press 1997) (discussing in 
depth the existence of patriarchy and finding the presence of patriarchy as “[a] society is 
patriarchal to the degree that it [promotes male privilege by being] male-dominated, male-
identified, and male-centered”).  Male privilege is far reaching.  As law professor and feminist 
theorist Catharine MacKinnon observed:  
Men’s physiology defines most sports, their needs define auto and health insurance 
coverage, their socially designed biographies define workplace expectations and 
successful career patterns, their perspectives and concerns define quality in 
scholarship, their experiences and obsessions define merit, their objectification of 
life defines art, their military service defines citizenship, their presence defines 
family, their inability to get along with each other—their wars and rulerships—
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In marriages, men not only receive male privilege generally, but 
they also receive direct benefits from the unpaid work of their 
spouses.184 
Regardless of whether or not a woman has chosen to forgo career 
activities to care for her family,185 the value of the benefit to a non-
caregiving spouse is not adequately compensated for post-divorce.186  
Even with the equitable division of assets in Massachusetts,187 the 
opportunity costs to women are nowhere accounted for.188  A lawyer 
who has forgone an hourly rate of $150 to raise a family may receive 
half of her husband’s retirement account, but she has lost the seniority, 
earning capacity, and other intangibles like professional status.  
Divorced women are at a higher risk of poverty as they age.189 
Language such as the amendment proposed in this Note recognizes 
the value of caregiving—not just to the payor spouse, but to the entire 
Commonwealth.190  It is not meant as a punitive measure for non-
caregiving husbands, so much as a legal mechanism for remedying part 
of the disparity divorced mothers face.191 
 
defines history, their image defines god.   
CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW, 36 
(Harvard University Press 1987). 
184. FORBES, supra note 158 (finding that a non-caregiving spouse who received the 
benefit of the average 94.7 hours per week of unpaid work by stay at home mothers would 
need to pay $112,962 for those services in the marketplace)). 
185. But see FOLBRE, supra note 139 (“[s]ocial norms have an important impact on 
women’s preferences. . . .”). 
186. MOE & SHANDY, supra note 135, at 131(citing that many researchers estimate that 
women suffer a decrease in their post-divorce standard of living by as much as one-third). 
187. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 208, § 32 (2007 & Supp. 2013) (providing factors to 
consider for equitable division of marital assets). 
188. Ann Laquer Estin, Maintenance, Alimony, and the Rehabilitation of Family Care, 
71 N.C. L. REV. 721, 747 (1993) (“[l]ong-term costs of caregiving are effectively ignored in 
the present system.  The usual response to long-term costs is a rehabilitative maintenance 
award that subsidizes the costs of retraining, but is not designed to compensate fully the long-
term losses that result for a period of caregiving.”). 
189. For example, see data from the Social Security Administration: “20 percent of 
divorced women aged 65 or older live in poverty, compared with 18 percent of never-married 
women and 15 percent of widowed women.”  Barbara A. Butrica & Karen E. Smith, The 
Retirement Prospects of Divorced Women, 72 SOC. SECURITY BULL. No. 1 (2012), available 
at http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/ssb/v72n1/v72n1p11.html. 
190. See FOLBRE supra note 140 and the societal benefits of “positive externalities” that 
provide benefits to communities as a whole. 
191. Even if the proposed amendment were meant to hold one individual accountable 
for the wrongs of many, the United States does have some legal history of using reparations as 
a means for justice.  See generally Alfred L. Brophy, Reconsidering Reparations, 81 IND. L.J. 
811 (2006) (a historical overview of legislative reparation in American history and a proposal 
to relax the relationship between wrongdoer and payor); David C. Gray, A No-Excuse 
Approach to Transitional Justice: Reparations as Tools of Extraordinary Justice, 87 WASH. 
U. L. REV. 1043 (2010) (an argument for abandoning interpretations of reparations as special 
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D.  Predicting Parity: An Argument for a Legislative Definition of 
“Self-Sufficiency” 
Leaving the measure by which rehabilitative alimony awards will 
be determined unanswered is counter-productive to the legislative goal 
of increased case predictability.  Without legislative guidance, judges 
may vary widely as to when a recipient-spouse has been rehabilitated.  
Firstly, judges may disagree as to what the goal of a rehabilitative 
alimony award is.  Lobbyists, the Massachusetts Bar Association, and 
politicians192 clamored for predictability, but does a vague standard of 
self-sufficiency really meet that goal? 
As legal scholars have lamented, “[i]f we do not know what we are 
trying to accomplish by giving the wife alimony, we will not easily be 
able to decide whether it should be granted in a particular case, or, if so, 
in what amount”193  And in Massachusetts, with the new introduction of 
four different types of alimony, judges may not easily decide which type 
of alimony should be awarded.  Since rehabilitative alimony has no 
limitations as to what length the marriage must have been to qualify, 
unlike reimbursement or transitional alimony, nearly any marriage may 
result in a rehabilitative alimony award.194 
If rehabilitative alimony is based on financial need there is still the 
difficulty of deciding how that need would be satisfied.  As critics of the 
need-based theory of alimony rightly point out, “there is no clear 
definition of what level of support satisfies ‘need.’  Decisions variously 
conflate need with subsistence, with a middle-class lifestyle, or with the 
prior marital standard of living.”195  An amendment defining self-
sufficiency as the post-divorce standard of living of the other partner 
would take the guesswork out of judicial ruling on need satisfaction. 
Furthermore, in the definition of rehabilitative alimony, the 
legislature suggests that methods of rehabilitation may include 
reemployment, completion of job training, or education.196  However, 
with slow job growth and women becoming re-employed more slowly 
 
cases of ordinary justice, or as solely retrospective or solely prospective in nature.  The author 
“argues that ‘I didn’t do it’ is a non sequitur in debates about reparations where the 
fundamental question is ‘How do we make it right?’”). 
192. See supra Part II.B. 
193. David H. Kelsey & Patrick P. Fry, The Relationship Between Permanent and 
Rehabilitative Alimony, 4 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL LAW 1, 4 (1988) (citing HOMER H. 
CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 441 (1968)). 
194. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 208, § 48 (2007 & Supp. 2013). 
195. Emily M. May, Should Moving In Mean Losing Out? Making A Case to Clarify the 
Legal Effect of Cohabitation On Alimony, 62 DUKE L.J. 403, 413 (2012). 
196. ch. 208, § 48. 
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than men,197 the feasibility of rehabilitation through these means is less 
than certain.  Résumé gaps are red-flags for many potential employers, 
and technology changes may make some skills obsolete.198  A Work-Life 
Center survey found that only three-quarters of highly qualified women 
who wanted to re-enter the workforce were able to do so successfully.199  
As the Displaced Homemakers Network opined, “[t]he saddest sight is 
the middle aged woman who has been convinced she should go back to 
school and emerges two or four years older, a well-educated 
unemployable.”200 
Even if mothers are able to find re-employment, the possibility that 
divorced women may wind up joining the working poor makes self-
sufficiency potentially elusive.201  Women who have taken time out of 
their careers to have and/or raise children will receive less in social 
security,202 and are less likely to have put savings aside for retirement.203  
The unsettling result could be divorced women who have been 
“rehabilitated” but are unable to retire.  Thanks to factors such as the 
wage gap,204 the “mommy-penalty,”205 and the difficulty of re-entering 
the workforce during the worst recession in decades,206 it is more likely 
that a “rehabilitated” spouse will not be able to earn enough income to 
retire at the traditional age.  Women already constitute a higher 
percentage of the working poor than men.207  Women and their children 
make up 26.3% of the 5.3 million families living below the poverty 
level.208 
 
197. See supra Part III.B. 
198. MOE & SHANDY, supra note 135, at 151. 
199. MOE & SHANDY, supra note 135, at 151 (also noting that in 2004 the U.S. 
economy was much better than present, and that of the respondents who did return to work, 
nearly two-third changed industries and nearly one-half became unemployed). 
200. Starnes, supra note 14, at 98. 
201. Starnes, supra note 14, at 98 (“[I]n a worst-case scenario, rehabilitative 
maintenance may merely delay a homemaker’s descent into poverty.”). 
202. For an in-depth analysis of the social security system and how it fails to 
compensate for unpaid caregiving, see GENDER AND SOCIAL SECURITY REFORM: WHAT’S 
FAIR FOR WOMEN? (Neil Gilbert ed., 2006). 
203. HEALTH POLICY: CRISIS AND REFORM 303 (Carroll Estes et al. eds., 6th ed. 2013) 
(“Women in Medicare have on average lower incomes, fewer assets, and less generous 
retirement coverage than men.”). 
204. Persistence of the Gender Pay Gap, supra note 8. 
205. MOE & SHANDY, supra note 135, at 127-28 (discussing that wage penalties for 
caretaking trail women through their working lives). 
206. MOE & SHANDY, supra note 135, at 151. 
207. U.S. BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., A PROFILE OF THE WORKING POOR, 2010 (March 
2012) 1, available at http://www.bls.gov/cps/cpswp2010.pdf (“working poor” defined as 
“persons who spent at least 27 weeks in the labor force . . . but whose incomes still fell below 
the official poverty line”). 
208. Id. 
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The Legislature would be wise to prevent more working mothers 
from adding to this statistic and to make it clear to the courts when a 
recipient can and cannot be rehabilitated.  By adopting the proposed 
amendment, the legislature can better ensure predictability by giving 
courts the necessary framework by which to determine who the best 
candidates for rehabilitative alimony are, and how the courts will know 
that they have successfully achieved self-sufficiency. 
CONCLUSION 
In his second inaugural speech, President Obama recognized the 
inequalities that American women continue to face.  “For our journey is 
not complete until our wives, our mothers, and daughters can earn a 
living equal to their efforts.”209  Likewise, the journey of alimony reform 
in Massachusetts is not complete until the state legislature demands that 
self-sufficiency for women is measured by the equal economic standing 
between two former spouses. 
The world is not changing as fast as we might hope.  Labor, such as 
caregiving for one’s own family, remains uncompensated.  Women are 
still paid less than men for the same work.210  The careers that have the 
highest concentration of female workers are still among the least 
lucrative.211  Women are still underrepresented in the highest levels of 
management, and overrepresented among the world’s poor.212  
Rehabilitative alimony must account for these realities. 
The Massachusetts legislature must make clear that punishing 
women for their roles as caregivers is unacceptable.213  In the context of 
a statewide rally for predictability, the legislature must adopt language 
that gives the courts full reign to balance that goal while valuing 
caregiving.  The feasibility of an award for rehabilitative alimony must 
be measured by the economic status of the payor spouse.  Only in 
situations where the parties can achieve relatively equal status should 
rehabilitative alimony be appropriate. 
By using parity as a measuring stick, rehabilitative alimony can 
 
209. Obama’s Second Inaugural Speech, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2013, http://www.nytime 
s.com/2013/01/21/us/politics/obamas-second-inaugural-speech.html?pagewanted=3&_r=0. 
210. See supra Part III.B. 
211. See supra Part III.B. 
212. See supra Part III.B. 
213. As another author penned twenty years ago, “[p]retending that rehabilitative 
maintenance can ‘repair’ a ‘damaged’ woman by turning back the clock and giving her the 
career opportunities she had before her marriage is a cruel, if convenient, illusion.”  Starnes, 
supra note 14, at 98-99.  This author would add that failing to ensure that rehabilitative 
alimony is only awarded in cases of economic parity would be the ultimate illusion. 
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continue to be used as a tool for gaining independence, without 
sacrificing one of the parties’ economic well being or predictability.  
Independence won at the expense of one party is not independence at all; 
it is simply an illusion. 
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